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Abstract
We consider the secure transmission of information over an ergodic fading channel in the
presence of an eavesdropper. Our eavesdropper can be viewed as the wireless counterpart
of Wyner’s wiretapper. The secrecy capacity of such a system is characterized under the
assumption of asymptotically long coherence intervals. We first consider the full Channel State
Information (CSI) case, where the transmitter has access to the channel gains of the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity under this full CSI assumption serves as
an upper bound for the secrecy capacity when only the CSI of the legitimate receiver is known
at the transmitter, which is characterized next. In each scenario, the perfect secrecy capacity is
obtained along with the optimal power and rate allocation strategies. We then propose a low-
complexity on/off power allocation strategy that achieves near-optimal performance with only
the main channel CSI. More specifically, this scheme is shown to be asymptotically optimal
as the average SNR goes to infinity, and interestingly, is shown to attain the secrecy capacity
under the full CSI assumption. Remarkably, our results reveal the positive impact of fading
on the secrecy capacity and establish the critical role of rate adaptation, based on the main
channel CSI, in facilitating secure communications over slow fading channels.
1 Introduction
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shannon [1]. This strong notion
of secrecy does not rely on any assumptions on the computational resources of the eavesdropper.
More specifically, perfect information-theoretic secrecy requires that I(W ;Z) = 0, i.e., the signal
Z received by the eavesdropper does not provide any additional information about the transmitted
messageW . Shannon considered a scenario where both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
have direct access to the transmitted signal. Under this model, he proved a negative result implying
that the achievability of perfect secrecy requires the entropy of the private key K, used to encrypt
the message W , to be larger than or equal to the entropy of the message itself (i.e., H(K) ≥ H(W )
for perfect secrecy). However, it was later shown by Wyner in [2] that this negative result was
a consequence of the over-restrictive model used in [1]. Wyner introduced the wiretap channel
which accounts for the difference in the two noise processes, as observed by the destination and
wiretapper. In this model, the wiretapper has no computational limitations and is assumed to
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know the codebook used by the transmitter. Under the assumption that the wiretapper’s signal
is a degraded version of the destination’s signal, Wyner characterized the tradeoff between the
information rate to the destination and the level of ignorance at the wiretapper (measured by its
equivocation), and showed that it is possible to achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity. This work
was later extended to non-degraded channels by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3], where it was shown that if
the main channel is less noisy or more capable than the wiretapper channel, then it is possible to
achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity.
More recently, the effect of slow fading on the secrecy capacity was studied in [8, 9]. In these
works, it is assumed that the fading is quasi-static which leads to an alternative definition of
outage probability, wherein secure communications can be guaranteed only for the fraction of time
when the main channel is stronger than the channel seen by the eavesdropper. This performance
metric appears to have an operational significance only in delay sensitive applications with full
Channel State Information (CSI). The absence of CSI sheds doubt on the operational significance
of outage-based secrecy since it limits the ability of the source to know which parts of the message
are decoded by the eavesdropper. In this paper, we focus on delay-tolerant applications which
allow for the adoption of an ergodic version of the slow fading channel, instead of the outage-based
formulation. Quite interestingly, we show in the sequel that, under this model, one can achieve
a perfectly secure non-zero rate even when the eavesdropper channel is more capable then the
legitimate channel on the average. In particular, our work here characterizes the secrecy capacity
of the slow fading channel in the presence of an eavesdropper [10]. Our eavesdropper is the wireless
counterpart of Wyner’s wiretapper. We first assume that the transmitter knows the CSI of both
the legitimate and eavesdropper channels, and derive the optimal power allocation strategy that
achieves the secrecy capacity. Next we consider the case where the transmitter only knows the
legitimate channel CSI and, again, derive the optimal power allocation strategy. We then propose
an on/off power transmission scheme, with variable rate allocation, which approaches the optimal
performance for asymptotically large average SNR. Interestingly, this scheme is also shown to attain
the secrecy capacity under the full CSI assumption which implies that, at high SNR values, the
additional knowledge of the eavesdropper CSI does not yield any gains in terms of the secrecy
capacity for slow fading channels. Finally, our theoretical and numerical results are used to argue
that rate adaptation plays a more critical role than power control in achieving the secrecy capacity
of slow fading channels. This observation contrasts the scenario without secrecy constraints, where
transmission strategies with constant rate are able to achieve capacity [4].
2 System Model
The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1. The source S communicates with a destination D in
the presence of an eavesdropper E. During any coherence interval i, the signal received by the
destination and the eavesdropper are given by, respectively
y(i) = gM(i)x(i) + wM(i),
z(i) = gE(i)x(i) + wE(i),
where gM(i), gE(i) are the channel gains from the source to the legitimate receiver (main chan-
nel) and the eavesdropper (eavesdropper channel) respectively, and wM(i), wE(i) represent the i.i.d
additive Gaussian noise with unit variance at the destination and the eavesdropper respectively.
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Figure 1: The Fading Channel with an Eavesdropper
We denote the fading power gains of the main and eavesdropper channels by hM(i) = |gM(i)|2
and hE(i) = |gE(i)|
2 respectively. We assume that both channels experience block fading, where
the channel gains remain constant during each coherence interval and change independently from
one coherence interval to the next. The fading process is assumed to be ergodic with a bounded
continuous distribution. Moreover, the fading coefficients of the destination and the eavesdropper
in any coherence interval are assumed to be independent of each other. We further assume that the
number of channel uses n1 within each coherence interval is large enough to allow for invoking ran-
dom coding arguments. As shown in the sequel, this assumption is instrumental in our achievability
proofs.
The source wishes to send a message W ∈ W = {1, 2, · · · ,M} to the destination. An (M,n)
code consists of the following elements: 1) a stochastic encoder fn(.) at the source that maps the
message1 w to a codeword xn ∈ X n, and 2) a decoding function φ: Yn → W at the legitimate
receiver. The average error probability of an (M,n) code at the legitimate receiver is defined as
P ne =
∑
w∈W
1
M
Pr(φ(yn) 6= w|w was sent). (1)
The equivocation rate Re at the eavesdropper is defined as the entropy rate of the transmitted
message conditioned on the available CSI and the channel outputs at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
Re
∆
=
1
n
H(W |Zn, hnM , h
n
E) , (2)
where hnM = {hM(1), · · · , hM(n)} and h
n
E = {hE(1), · · · , hE(n)} denote the channel power gains of
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper in n coherence intervals, respectively. It indicates the
level of ignorance of the transmitted message W at the eavesdropper. In this paper we consider
only perfect secrecy which requires the equivocation rate Re to be equal to the message rate. The
perfect secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of codes
(2nRs, n) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ), we have
P ne ≤ ǫ,
Re =
1
n
H(W |Zn, hnM , h
n
E) ≥ Rs − ǫ.
1The realizations of the random variables W, X, Y, Z are represented by w, x, y, z respectively in the sequel.
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The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the maximum achievable perfect secrecy rate, i.e.,
Cs
∆
= sup
Pne ≤ǫ
Rs . (3)
Throughout the sequel, we assume that the CSI is known at the destination perfectly. Based on
the available CSI, the transmitter adapts its transmission power and rate to maximize the perfect
secrecy rate subject to a long-term average power constraint P¯ .
3 Full CSI at the Transmitter
Here we assume that at the beginning of each coherence interval, the transmitter knows the channel
states of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper perfectly. When hM and hE are both known
at the transmitter, one would expect the optimal scheme to allow for transmission only when
hM > hE , and to adapt the transmitted power according to the instantaneous values of hM and hE .
The following result formalizes this intuitive argument.
Theorem 1 When the channel gains of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are known
at the transmitter, the secrecy capacity is given by
C(F )s = max
P (hM ,hE)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
hE
[
log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))
]
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE ,
(4)
such that E{P (hM , hE)} ≤ P¯ . (5)
Proof : A detailed proof of achievability and the converse part is provided in the Appendix. Here,
we outline the scheme used in the achievability part. In this scheme, transmission occurs only
when hM > hE, and uses the power allocation policy P (hM , hE) that satisfies the average power
constraint (5). Moreover, the codeword rate at each instant is set to be log (1 + hMP (hM , hE)),
which varies according to the instantaneous channel gains. The achievable perfect secrecy rate at
any instant is then given by [log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))]+. Averaging over all
fading realizations, we get the average achievable perfect secrecy rate as
R(F )s =
∫∫
[log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
hE
[
log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))
]
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE .
One can then optimize over all feasible power control policies P (hM , hE) to maximize the perfect
secrecy rate. 2
We now derive the optimal power allocation policy that achieves the secrecy capacity under
the full CSI assumption. It is easy to check that the objective function is concave in P (hM , hE),
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and hence, by using the Lagrangian maximization approach for solving (4), we get the following
optimality condition
∂R
(F )
s
∂P (hM , hE)
=
hM
1 + hMP (hM , hE)
−
hE
1 + hEP (hM , hE)
− λ = 0,
whose solution is
P (hM , hE) =
1
2


√(
1
hE
−
1
hM
)2
+
4
λ
(
1
hE
−
1
hM
)
−
(
1
hM
+
1
hE
) . (6)
If for some (hM , hE), the value of P (hM , hE) obtained from (6) is negative, then it follows from the
concavity of the objective function w.r.t. P (hM , hE) that the optimal value of P (hM , hE) is 0. Thus
the optimal power allocation policy at the transmitter is given by
P (hM , hE) =
1
2


√(
1
hE
−
1
hM
)2
+
4
λ
(
1
hE
−
1
hM
)
−
(
1
hM
+
1
hE
)
+
, (7)
where [x]+ = max{0, x}, and the parameter λ is a constant that satisfies the power constraint
in (5) with equality. The secrecy capacity is then determined by substituting this optimal power
allocation policy for P (hM , hE) in (4).
4 Only Main Channel CSI at the Transmitter
In this section, we assume that at the beginning of each coherence interval, the transmitter only
knows the CSI of the main channel (legitimate receiver).
4.1 Optimal Power Allocation
We first characterize the secrecy capacity under this scenario in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 When only the channel gain of the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter, the
secrecy capacity is given by
C(M)s = max
P (hM )
∫∫
[log (1 + hMP (hM))− log (1 + hEP (hM))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE , (8)
such that E{P (hM)} ≤ P¯ . (9)
Proof : A detailed proof of achievability and the converse part is provided in the Appendix. Here,
we outline the scheme used to show achievability. We use the following variable rate transmission
scheme. During a coherence interval with main channel fading state hM , the transmitter transmits
codewords at rate log(1 + hMP (hM)) with power P (hM). This variable rate scheme relies on the
assumption of large coherence intervals and ensures that when hE > hM , the mutual information
between the source and the eavesdropper is upper bounded by log(1+hMP (hM)). When hE ≤ hM ,
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this mutual information will be log(1+hEP (hM)). Averaging over all the fading states, the average
rate of the main channel is given by∫∫
log (1 + hMP (hM)) f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE ,
while the information accumulated at the eavesdropper is∫∫
log (1 + min{hM , hE}P (hM)) f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE .
Hence for a given power control policy P (hM), the achievable perfect secrecy rate is given by
R(M)s =
∫∫
[log (1 + hMP (hM))− log (1 + hEP (hM))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE. (10)
One can then optimize over all feasible power control policies P (hM) to maximize the perfect secrecy
rate. Finally, we observe that our secure message is hidden across different fading states (please
refer to our proof for more details). 2
We now derive the optimal power allocation policy that achieves the secrecy capacity under
the main channel CSI assumption. Similar to Theorem 1, the objective function under this case is
also concave, and using the Lagrangian maximization approach for solving (8), we get the following
optimality condition.
∂R
(M)
s
∂P (hM)
=
hMPr (hE ≤ hM)
1 + hMP (hM)
−
∫ hM
0
(
hE
1 + hEP (hM)
)
f(hE)dhE − λ = 0,
where λ is a constant that satisfies the power constraint in (9) with equality. For any main channel
fading state hM , the optimal transmit power level P (hM) is determined from the above equation.
If the obtained power level turns out to be negative, then the optimal value of P (hM) is equal to 0.
This follows from the concavity of the objective function in (8) w.r.t. P (hM). The solution to this
optimization problem depends on the distributions f(hM) and f(hE). In the following, we focus on
the Rayleigh fading scenario with E{hM} = γM and E{hE} = γE in detail. With Rayleigh fading,
the objective function in (8) simplifies to
C(M)s = max
P (hM )
∫ ∞
0
[ (
1− e−(hM/γE)
)
log (1 + hMP (hM))−∫ hM
0
log (1 + hEP (hM))
1
γE
e−(hE/γE)dhE
]
1
γM
e−(hM/γM )dhM
= max
P (hM )
∫ ∞
0
[
log (1 + hMP (hM))− exp
(
1
γEP (hM)
)(
Ei
(
1
γEP (hM)
)
−
Ei
(
hM
γE
+
1
γEP (hM)
))]
1
γM
e−(hM/γM )dhM , (11)
where
Ei(x) =
∫ ∞
x
e−t
t
dt .
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Specializing the optimality conditions to the Rayleigh fading scenario, it can be shown that the
power level of the transmitter at any fading state hM is obtained by solving the equation
(
1− e−(hM/γE)
)( hM
1 + hMP (hM)
)
− λ−
(
1− e−(hM/γE)
)
P (hM)
+
exp
(
1
γEP (hM )
)
γE(P (hM))
2
[
Ei
(
1
γEP (hM)
)
− Ei
(
hM
γE
+
1
γEP (hM)
)]
= 0.
If there is no positive solution to this equation for a particular hM , then we set P (hM) = 0. The
secrecy capacity is then determined by substituting this optimal power allocation policy for P (hM)
in (11).
We observe that, unlike the traditional ergodic fading scenario, achieving the optimal perfor-
mance under a security constraint relies heavily on using a variable rate transmission strategy. This
can be seen by evaluating the performance of a constant rate strategy where a single codeword is
interleaved across infinitely many fading realizations. This interleaving will result in the eavesdrop-
per gaining more information, than the destination, when its channel is better than the main
channel, thereby yielding a perfect secrecy rate that is strictly smaller than that in (10). It is easy
to see that the achievable perfect secrecy rate of the constant rate scheme, assuming a Gaussian
codebook, is given by
max
P (hM )
∫∫
[log (1 + hMP (hM))− log (1 + hEP (hM))] f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE ,
such that E{P (hM)} ≤ P¯ .
Unlike the two previous optimization problems, the objective function in this optimization prob-
lem is not a concave function of P (hM). Using the Lagrangian formulation, we only get the following
necessary KKT conditions for the optimal point.
P (hM)
[
λ−
hM
1 + hMP (hM)
+
∫ (
hE
1 + hEP (hM)
)
f(hE)dhE
]
= 0,
λ ≥
hM
1 + hMP (hM)
−
∫ (
hE
1 + hEP (hM)
)
f(hE)dhE ,
E{P (hM)} = P¯ . (12)
4.2 On/Off Power Control
We now propose a transmission policy wherein the transmitter sends information only when the
channel gain of the legitimate receiver hM exceeds a pre-determined constant threshold τ > 0.
Moreover, when hM > τ , the transmitter always uses the same power level P . However, it is crucial
to adapt the rate of transmission instantaneously as log(1 + PhM) with hM . It is clear that for an
average power constraint P¯ , the constant power level used for transmission will be
P =
P¯
Pr(hM > τ)
.
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Using a similar argument as in the achievable part of Theorem 2, we get the perfect secrecy rate
achieved by the proposed scheme, using Gaussian inputs, as
R(CP )s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
τ
[log (1 + hMP )− log (1 + hEP )]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE .
Specializing to the Rayleigh fading scenario, we get
P =
P¯
Pr(hM > τ)
= P¯ e(τ/γM ) ,
and the secrecy capacity simplifies to
R(CP )s =
∫ ∞
τ
∫ hM
0
[
log
(
1 + hM P¯ e
(τ/γM )
)
− log
(
1 + hEP¯ e
(τ/γM )
)] 1
γM
e−(hM/γM )
1
γE
e−(hE/γE)dhEdhM ,
which then simplifies to
R(CP )s = e
−(τ/γM ) log
(
1 + τP¯ e(τ/γM )
)
+ exp
(
1
γM P¯ e
(τ/γM )
)
Ei
(
τ
γM
+
1
γM P¯ e
(τ/γM )
)
+exp
(
1
γEP¯ e
(τ/γM )
−
τ
γM
)[
Ei
(
τ
γE
+
1
γEP¯ e
(τ/γM )
)
− Ei
(
1
γEP¯ e
(τ/γM )
)]
− exp


[
1
γM
+ 1
γE
]
P¯ e(τ/γM )

Ei([ 1
γM
+
1
γE
] [
τ +
1
P¯ e(τ/γM )
])
.
One can then optimize over the threshold τ to get the maximum achievable perfect secrecy rate.
Finally, we establish the asymptotic optimality of this on/off scheme as the available average
transmission power P¯ →∞. For the on/off power allocation policy, we have
R(CP )s = lim
P¯→∞
∫ ∞
τ∗
∫ hM
0
log
(
1 + hMP
1 + hEP
)
f(hM)f(hE)dhEdhM .
Taking τ ∗ = 0, we get P = P¯ and
R(CP )s ≥ lim
P¯→∞
∫ ∞
0
∫ hM
0
log
(
(1/P¯ ) + hM
(1/P¯ ) + hE
)
f(hM)f(hE)dhEdhM
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ hM
0
lim
P¯→∞
log
(
(1/P¯ ) + hM
(1/P¯ ) + hE
)
f(hM)f(hE)dhEdhM
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ hM
0
log
(
hM
hE
)
f(hM)f(hE)dhEdhM = E{hM>hE}
{
log
(
hM
hE
)}
, (13)
where (a) follows from the Dominated Convergence Theorem, since∣∣∣∣log
(
(1/P¯ ) + hM
(1/P¯ ) + hE
)∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣log
(
hM
hE
)∣∣∣∣ , ∀P¯ when hM > hE ,
8
and
∫ ∞
0
∫ hM
0
log
(
hM
hE
)
f(hM)f(hE)dhEdhM <∞,
since E{hM} <∞,
∣∣∣ ∫ 10 log x dx∣∣∣ = 1 <∞ and f(hM), f(hE) are continuous and bounded.
Now under the full CSI assumption, we have
C(F )s = E{hM>hE}
{
log
(
1
P (hM ,hE)
+ hM
1
P (hM ,hE)
+ hE
)}
≤ E{hM>hE}
{
log
(
hM
hE
)}
. (14)
From (13) and (14), it is clear that the proposed on/off power allocation policy that uses only the
main channel CSI achieves the secrecy capacity under the full CSI assumption as P¯ → ∞. Thus
the absence of eavesdropper CSI at the transmitter does not reduce the secrecy capacity at high
SNR values.
5 Numerical Results
As an additional benchmark, we first obtain the performance when the transmitter does not have
any knowledge of both the main and eavesdropper channels (only receiver CSI). In this scenario,
the transmitter is unable to exploit rate/power adaptation and always transmits with power P¯ . It
is straightforward to see that the achievable perfect secrecy rate in this scenario (using Gaussian
inputs) is given by
R(R)s =
[∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
log
(
1 + hM P¯
)
− log
(
1 + hEP¯
)]
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE
]+
=
[∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 + hM P¯
)
f(hM)dhM −
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 + hEP¯
)
f(hE)dhE
]+
,
which reduces to the following for the Rayleigh fading scenario
R(R)s =
[
exp
(
1
γM P¯
)
Ei
(
1
γM P¯
)
− exp
(
1
γEP¯
)
Ei
(
1
γEP¯
)]+
.
Thus when γE ≥ γM , R
(R)
s = 0. The results for the Rayleigh normalized-symmetric case (γM =
γE = 1) are presented in Fig. 2. It is clear that the performance of the on/off power control scheme
is very close to the secrecy capacity (with only main channel CSI) for a wide range of SNRs and,
as expected, approaches the secrecy capacities, under both the full CSI and main channel CSI
assumptions, at high values of SNR. The performance of the constant rate scheme is much worse
than the other schemes that employ rate adaptation. Here we note that the performance curve for
the constant rate scheme might be a lower bound to the secrecy capacity (since the KKT conditions
are necessary but not sufficient for non-convex optimization). We then consider an asymmetric
scenario, wherein the eavesdropper channel is more capable than the main channel, with γM = 1
and γE = 2. The performance results for this scenario are plotted in Fig. 3. Again it is clear from
the plot that the performance of the on/off power control scheme is optimal at high values of SNR,
and that rate adaptation schemes yield higher perfect secrecy rates than constant rate transmission
schemes.
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Figure 2: Performance comparison for the symmetric scenario γM = γE = 1.
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Figure 3: Performance comparison for the asymmetric scenario γM = 1 and γE = 2.
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6 Conclusions
We have characterized the secrecy capacity of the slow fading channel with an eavesdropper under
different assumptions on the available transmitter CSI. Our work establishes the interesting result
that a non-zero perfectly secure rate is achievable in the fading channel even when the eavesdropper
is more capable than the legitimate receiver (on the average). By contrasting this conclusion
with the traditional AWGN scenario, one can see the positive impact of fading on enhancing the
secrecy capacity. Furthermore, we proposed a low-complexity on/off power transmission scheme and
established its asymptotic optimality. This optimality shows that the presence of eavesdropper CSI
at the transmitter does not offer additional gains in the secrecy capacity for slow fading channels,
at high enough SNR levels. The knowledge of the main channel CSI, however, is crucial since
it is easy to see that the absence of this information leads to a zero secrecy capacity when the
eavesdropper is more capable than the legitimate receiver on the average. Finally, our theoretical
and numerical results established the critical role of appropriate rate adaptation in facilitating
secure communications over slow fading channels.
A Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove the achievability of (4) by showing that for any perfect secrecy rate Rs < C
(F )
s , there
exists a sequence of (2nRs, n) block codes with average power P¯ , equivocation rate Re > Rs − ǫ,
and probability of error P ne → 0 as n → ∞. Let Rs = C
(F )
s − 3δ for some δ > 0. We quantize
the main channel gains hM ∈ [0,M1] into uniform bins {hM,i}
q1
i=1, and the eavesdropper channel
gains hE ∈ [0,M2] into uniform bins {hE,j}
q2
j=1. The channels are said to be in state sij (i ∈ [1, q1],
j ∈ [1, q2]), if hM,i ≤ hM < hM,(i+1) and hE,j ≤ hE < hE,(j+1), where hM,(q1+1) = M1, hE,(q2+1) =M2.
We also define a power control policy for any state sij by
P (hM,i, hE,j) = inf
hM,i≤hM<hM,(i+1),hE,j≤hE<hE,(j+1)
P (hM , hE) , (15)
where P (hM , hE) is the optimal power allocation policy in (7) that satisfies P (hM , hE) = 0 for all
hM ≤ hE , and the power constraint∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
hE
P (hM , hE)f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE ≤ P¯ . (16)
Consider a time-invariant AWGN channel with channel gains hM ∈ [hM,i, hM,(i+1)) and hE ∈
[hE,j, hE,(j+1)). It is shown in [5,6] that for this channel, we can develop a sequence of (2
nij(Rs)ij , nij)
codes with codeword rate log (1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j)) and perfect secrecy rate
(Rs)ij =
[
log (1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j))− log
(
1 + hE,(j+1)P (hM,i, hE,j)
) ]+
, (17)
such that the average power is P (hM,i, hE,j) and with error probability P
ij
e → 0 as nij →∞, where
nij = n Pr
(
hM,i ≤ hM < hM,(i+1), hE,j ≤ hE < hE,(j+1)
)
for sufficiently large n. Note that the expression in (17) is obtained by considering the worst case
scenario hM = hM,i, hE = hE,(j+1) that yields the smallest perfect secrecy rate.
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For transmitting the message index w ∈ {1, · · · , 2nRs}, we first map w to the indices {wij} by
dividing the nRs bits which determine the message index into sets of nij(Rs)ij bits. The transmitter
uses a multiplexing strategy and transmits codewords {xwij} at codeword rate log (1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j))
and perfect secrecy rate (Rs)ij, when the channel is in state sij . As n → ∞, this scheme achieves
the perfect secrecy rate (using the ergodicity of the channel),
Rs =
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j)
1 + hE,(j+1)P (hM,i, hE,j)
)]+
Pr
(
hM,i ≤ hM < hM,(i+1), hE,j ≤ hE < hE,(j+1)
)
.
Thus for a fixed δ, we can find a sufficiently large n such that
Rs ≥
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j)
1 + hE,(j+1)P (hM,i, hE,j)
)]+
Pr
(
hM,i ≤ hM < hM,(i+1), hE,j ≤ hE < hE,(j+1)
)
−δ.
(18)
For asymptotically large n, using the ergodicity of the channel, the average power of the multiplexing
scheme satisfies
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
P (hM,i, hE,j)
∫ hM,(i+1)
hM,i
∫ hE,(j+1)
hE,j
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE
(a)
≤
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
P (hM , hE)f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE
(b)
≤ P¯ ,
where (a) follows from the definition of P (hM,i, hE,j) in (15) and (b) follows from (16). Moreover,
the error probability of the multiplexing scheme is upper bounded by
P ne ≤
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
P ije → 0, as n→∞.
Now since
C(F )s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE
≤
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
hE
log
(
hM
hE
)
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE < ∞,
(because E{hM} < ∞,
∣∣∣ ∫ 10 log x dx∣∣∣ = 1 < ∞ and f(hM), f(hE) are continuous and bounded),
there exist M1 and M2 for a fixed δ such that∫ M1
0
∫ ∞
M2
[log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE <
δ
3
,
∫ ∞
M1
∫ M2
0
[log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE <
δ
3
, (19)∫ ∞
M1
∫ ∞
M2
[log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE <
δ
3
.
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Moreover, for fixed M1 and M2, the dominated convergence theorem implies that
lim
(q1,q2)→∞
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j)
1 + hE,(j+1)P (hM,i, hE,j)
)]+
Pr
(
hM,i ≤ hM < hM,(i+1), hE,j ≤ hE < hE,(j+1)
)
= lim
(q1,q2)→∞
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
∫ hM,(i+1)
hM,i
∫ hE,(j+1)
hE,j
[
log
(
1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j)
1 + hE,(j+1)P (hM,i, hE,j)
)]+
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE
=
∫ M1
0
∫ M2
0
[
log
(
1 + hMP (hM , hE)
1 + hEP (hM , hE)
)]+
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE. (20)
Choosing M1,M2 that satisfy (19) and combining (19) and (20), we see that for a given δ, there
exist sufficiently large q1, q2 such that
q1∑
i=1
q2∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 + hM,iP (hM,i, hE,j)
1 + hE,(j+1)P (hM,i, hE,j)
)]+
Pr
(
hM,i ≤ hM < hM,(i+1), hE,j ≤ hE < hE,(j+1)
)
≥
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
log
(
1 + hMP (hM , hE)
1 + hEP (hM , hE)
)]+
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE − 2δ. (21)
Combining (18) and (21), we get the desired result.
We now prove the converse part by showing that for any perfect secrecy rate Rs with equivocation
rate Re > Rs − ǫ and error probability P ne → 0 as n → ∞, there exists a power allocation policy
P (hM , hE) satisfying the average power constraint, such that
Rs ≤
∫∫
[log(1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log(1 + hEP (hM , hE))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE .
Consider any sequence of (2nRs , n) codes with perfect secrecy rate Rs and equivocation rate Re,
such that Re > Rs − ǫ, with average power less than or equal to P¯ and error probability P ne → 0
as n→∞. Let N(hM , hE) denote the number of times the channel is in fading state (hM , hE) over
the interval [0, n]. Also let P n(hM , hE) = E
{∑n
i=1 |xw(i)|
21{hM (i)=hM ,hE(i)=hE}
}
, where {xw} are the
codewords corresponding to the message w and the expectation is taken over all codewords. We
note that the equivocation H(W |Zn, hnM , h
n
E) only depends on the marginal distribution of Z
n, and
thus does not depend on whether Z(i) is a physically or stochastically degraded version of Y (i) or
vice versa. Hence we assume in the following derivation that for any fading state, either Z(i) is a
physically degraded version of Y (i) or vice versa (since the noise processes are Gaussian), depending
on the instantaneous channel state. Thus we have
nRe = H(W |Z
n, hnM , h
n
E)
(a)
≤ H(W |Zn, hnM , h
n
E)−H(W |Z
n, Y n, hnM , h
n
E) + nδn
= I(W ;Y n|Zn, hnM , h
n
E) + nδn
(b)
≤ I(Xn;Y n|Zn, hnM , h
n
E) + nδn
= H(Y n|Zn, hnM , h
n
E)−H(Y
n|Xn, Zn, hnM , h
n
E) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y (i)|Y i−1, Zn, hnM , h
n
E)−H(Y (i)|Y
i−1, Xn, Zn, hnM , h
n
E)
]
+ nδn
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(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Y (i)|Z(i), hM(i), hE(i))−H(Y (i)|X(i), Z(i), hM(i), hE(i))] + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X(i);Y (i)|Z(i), hM(i), hE(i)) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
∫∫
I(X;Y |Z, hM , hE)1{hM (i)=hM ,hE(i)=hE}dhMdhE + nδn (22)
=
∫∫
I(X;Y |Z, hM , hE)N(hM , hE)dhMdhE + nδn
(d)
≤
∫∫
N(hM , hE) [log(1 + hMP
n(hM , hE))− log(1 + hEP
n(hM , hE))]
+ dhMdhE + nδn.
In the above derivation, (a) follows from the Fano inequality, (b) follows from the data processing
inequality since W → Xn → (Y n, Zn) forms a Markov chain, (c) follows from the fact that con-
ditioning reduces entropy and from the memoryless property of the channel, (d) follows from the
fact that given hM and hE, the fading channel reduces to an AWGN channel with channel gains
(hM , hE) and average transmission power P
n(hM , hE), for which
I(X;Y |Z, hM , hE) ≤ [log(1 + hMP
n(hM , hE))− log(1 + hEP
n(hM , hE))]
+ ,
as shown in [5, 6]. Since the codewords satisfy the power constraint, we have∫∫
P n(hM , hE)
(
N(hM , hE)
n
)
dhMdhE ≤ P¯ .
For any hM , hE such that f(hM , hE) 6= 0, {P
n(hM , hE)} are bounded sequences in n. Thus there
exists a subsequence that converges to a limit P (hM , hE) as n → ∞. Since for each n, the power
constraint is satisfied, we have∫∫
P (hM , hE)f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE ≤ P¯ . (23)
Now, we have
Re ≤
∫∫
N(hM , hE)
n
[
log
(
1 + hMP
n(hM , hE)
1 + hEP n(hM , hE)
)]+
dhMdhE + δn.
Taking the limit along the convergent subsequence and using the ergodicity of the channel, we get
Re ≤
∫∫ [
log
(
1 + hMP (hM , hE)
1 + hEP (hM , hE)
)]+
f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE + δn.
The claim is thus proved.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let Rs = C
(M)
s − δ for some small δ > 0. Let n = n1m, where n1 represents the number of
symbols transmitted in each coherence interval, and m represents the number of coherence intervals
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over which the message W is transmitted. Let R = E{log (1 + hMP (hM))} − ǫ. We first generate
all binary sequences {V} of length nR and then independently assign each of them randomly to
one of 2nRs groups, according to a uniform distribution. This ensures that any of the sequences
are equally likely to be within any of the groups. Each secret message w ∈ {1, · · · , 2nRs} is then
assigned a groupV(w). To encode a particular message w, the stochastic encoder randomly selects a
sequence v from the corresponding group V(w), according to a uniform distribution. This sequence
v consisting of nR bits is then sub-divided into independent blocks {v(1), · · · ,v(m)}, where the
block v(i) consists of n1 [log (1 + hM(i)P (hM(i)))− ǫ] bits, and is transmitted in the ith coherence
interval (i ∈ {1, · · · , m}). As m→∞, using the ergodicity of the channel, we have
lim
m→∞
m∑
i=1
n1 [log (1 + hM(i)P (hM(i)))− ǫ] = n1m [E{log (1 + hMP (hM))} − ǫ] = nR.
We then generate i.i.d. Gaussian codebooks {Xn1(i) : i = 1, · · · , m} consisting of 2n1[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−ǫ]
codewords, each of length n1 symbols. In the i
th coherence interval, the transmitter encodes the
block v(i) into the codeword xn1(i), which is then transmitted over the fading channel. The legit-
imate receiver receives yn1(i) while the eavesdropper receives zn1(i) in the ith coherence interval.
The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper can then be lower bounded as follows.
nRe = H(W |Z
n1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
= H(W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)−H(Z
n1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)
= H(W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)−H(Z
n1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)
−H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
= H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E) +H(W,Z
n1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
−H(Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)−H(X
n1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
≥ H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E) +H(Z
n1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
−H(Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)−H(X
n1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
= H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)− I(Z
n1(1), · · · , Zn1(m);Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|hnM , h
n
E)
−H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
= H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
−H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
(a)
=
m∑
i=1
H(Xn1(i)|Zn1(i), hM(i), hE(i))−H(X
n1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
(b)
≥
∑
i∈Nm
H(Xn1(i)|Zn1(i), hM(i), hE(i))−H(X
n1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
=
∑
i∈Nm
[H(Xn1(i)|hM(i), hE(i))− I(X
n1(i);Zn1(i)|hM(i), hE(i))]
−H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
≥
∑
i∈Nm
n1 [log (1 + hM(i)P (hM(i)))− log (1 + hE(i)P (hM(i)))− ǫ]
−H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
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≥
m∑
i=1
n1
{
[log (1 + hM(i)P (hM(i)))− log (1 + hE(i)P (hM(i)))]
+ − ǫ
}
−H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)
(c)
= nC(M)s −H(X
n1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E)− nǫ. (24)
In the above derivation, (a) follows from the memoryless property of the channel and the indepen-
dence of the Xn1(i)’s, (b) is obtained by removing all those terms which correspond to the coherence
intervals i /∈ Nm, where Nm = {i ∈ {1, · · · , m} : hM (i) > hE(i)}, and (c) follows from the ergodicity
of the channel as m→∞.
Now we show that the term H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E) vanishes as
m,n1 → ∞ by using a list decoding argument. In this list decoding, at coherence interval i, the
eavesdropper first constructs a list Li such that xn1(i) ∈ Li if (xn1(i), zn1(i)) are jointly typical.
Let L = L1 × L2 × · · · × Lm. Given w, the eavesdropper declares that xˆ
n = (xn1(1), · · · , xn1(m))
was transmitted, if xˆn is the only codeword such that xˆn ∈ B(w) ∩ L, where B(w) is the set of
codewords corresponding to the message w. If the eavesdropper finds none or more than one such
sequence, then it declares an error. Hence, there are two type of error events: 1) E1: the transmitted
codeword xnt is not in L, 2) E2: ∃x
n 6= xnt such that x
n ∈ B(w) ∩ L. Thus the error probability
Pr(xˆn 6= xnt ) = Pr(E1 ∪ E2) ≤ Pr(E1) + Pr(E2). Based on the AEP, we know that Pr(E1) ≤ ǫ1. In
order to bound Pr(E2), we first bound the size of Li. We let
φi(x
n1(i)|zn1(i)) =
{
1, when (xn1(i), zn1(i)) are jointly typical,
0, otherwise.
(25)
Now
E{‖Li‖} = E


∑
xn1 (i)
φi(x
n1(i)|zn1(i))


≤ E

1 +
∑
xn1 (i)6=x
n1
t (i)
φi(x
n1(i)|zn1(i))


≤ 1 +
∑
xn1 (i)6=x
n1
t (i)
E {φi(x
n1(i)|zn1(i))}
≤ 1 + 2n1[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−log(1+hE(i)P (hM (i)))−ǫ]
≤ 2
n1
(
[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−log(1+hE(i)P (hM (i)))−ǫ]
++ 1
n1
)
. (26)
Hence
E{‖L‖} =
m∏
i=1
E{‖Li‖} ≤ 2
m∑
i=1
n1
(
[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−log(1+hE(i)P (hM (i)))−ǫ]
++ 1
n1
)
. (27)
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Thus
Pr(E2) ≤ E


∑
xn∈L,xn 6=xnt
Pr(xn ∈ B(w))


(a)
≤ E
{
‖L‖2−nRs
}
(28)
≤ 2−nRs2
m∑
i=1
n1
(
[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−log(1+hE(i)P (hM (i)))−ǫ]
++ 1
n1
)
≤ 2
−n
(
Rs−
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−log(1+hE(i)P (hM (i)))−ǫ]
++ 1
n1
))
= 2
−n
(
Rs−
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
[log(1+hM (i)P (hM (i)))−log(1+hE(i)P (hM (i)))]
++ 1
n1
)
+
|Nm|ǫ
m
)
,
where (a) follows from the uniform distribution of the codewords in B(w). Now as n1 → ∞ and
m→∞, we get
Pr(E2) ≤ 2
−n(Cs−δ−Cs+cǫ) = 2−n(cǫ−δ),
where c = Pr(hM > hE). Thus, by choosing ǫ > (δ/c), the error probability Pr(E2)→ 0 as n→∞.
Now using Fano’s inequality, we get
H(Xn1(1), · · · , Xn1(m)|W,Zn1(1), · · · , Zn1(m), hnM , h
n
E) ≤ nδn → 0 as n→∞.
Combining this with (24), we get the desired result.
For the converse part, consider any sequence of (2nRs, n) codes with perfect secrecy rate Rs and
equivocation rate Re, such that Re > Rs − ǫ, with average power less than or equal to P¯ and error
probability P ne → 0 as n → ∞. We follow the same steps used in the proof of the converse in
Theorem 1 with the only difference that now the transmission power P n(.) only depends on hM .
From (22), we get
nRe ≤
n∑
i=1
∫∫
I(X;Y |Z, hM , hE)1{hM (i)=hM ,hE(i)=hE}dhMdhE + nδn
=
∫∫
I(X;Y |Z, hM , hE)N(hM , hE)dhMdhE + nδn
≤
∫∫
N(hM , hE) [log(1 + hMP
n(hM))− log(1 + hEP
n(hM))]
+ dhMdhE + nδn.
This follows from the fact that given hM and hE , the fading channel reduces to an AWGN channel
with channel gains (hM , hE) and average transmission power P
n(hM), for which Gaussian inputs
are known to be optimal [5, 6].
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we take the limit over the convergent subsequence and use
the ergodicity of the channel to obtain
Re ≤
∫∫
[log(1 + hMP (hM))− log(1 + hEP (hM))]
+ f(hM)f(hE)dhMdhE + δn, (29)
where E{P (hM)} ≤ P¯ . The claim is thus proved.
17
References
[1] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Technical Journal,
vol. 28, pp. 656-715, Oct. 1949.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355-
1387, 1975.
[3] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. on
Information Theory, vol. 24, pp. 339-348, May 1978.
[4] G. Caire, G. Taricco and E. Biglieri, “Optimum power control over fading channels,” IEEE
Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 1468-1489, July 1999.
[5] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian Wire-Tap Channel,” IEEE Trans.
on Information Theory, vol. 24, pp. 451-456, July 1978.
[6] Y. Liang and H. Vincent Poor, “Generalized multiple access channels with confidential mes-
sages,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, April 2006.
[7] A. Goldsmith and P. Varaiya, “Capacity of fading channels with channel side information,”
IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 1986–1992, Nov. 1997.
[8] P. Parada and R. Blahut, “Secrecy Capacity of SIMO and Slow Fading Channels,” Proc. of
ISIT 2005, pp. 2152–2155, Sep. 2005.
[9] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy Capacity of Wireless Channels,” Proc. of ISIT
2006, July 2006.
[10] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The Secrecy Capacity of the Fading Wiretap Channel,”
Submitted to ICASSP 2007, Sep. 2006.
18
